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ABSTRACT
The rapid growth of real-time huge data capturing has pushed the
deep learning and data analytic computing to the edge systems.
Real-time object recognition on the edge is one of the representative
deep neural network (DNN) powered edge systems for real-world
mission-critical applications, such as autonomous driving and aug-
mented reality. While DNN powered object detection edge systems
celebrate many life-enriching opportunities, they also open doors
for misuse and abuse. This paper presents three Targeted adversar-
ial Objectness Gradient attacks, coined as TOG, which can cause
the state-of-the-art deep object detection networks to suffer from
object-vanishing, object-fabrication, and object-mislabeling attacks.
We also present a universal objectness gradient attack to use ad-
versarial transferability for black-box attacks, which is effective on
any inputs with negligible attack time cost, low human perceptibil-
ity, and particularly detrimental to object detection edge systems.
We report our experimental measurements using two benchmark
datasets (PASCAL VOC and MS COCO) on two state-of-the-art
detection algorithms (YOLO and SSD). The results demonstrate
serious adversarial vulnerabilities and the compelling need for de-
veloping robust object detection systems.
KEYWORDS
adversarial machine learning, object detection, neural network,
edge security and privacy.
1 INTRODUCTION
Edge data analytics and deep learning as a service on the edge
have attracted a flurry of research and development efforts in both
industry and academics [5, 9]. Open source deep object detection
networks [8, 12, 13] have fueled new edge applications and edge sys-
tem deployments, such as traffic sign identification on autonomous
vehicles [14] and intrusion detection on smart surveillance sys-
tems [3]. However, very few performed systematic studies on the
vulnerabilities of real-time deep object detectors, which are critical
to edge security and privacy. Figure 1 shows a typical scenario
where an edge system receives an input image or video frame from
a sensor (e.g., a camera), and it runs a real-time DNN object detec-
tion model (e.g., YOLOv3 [12]) on the edge device (e.g., a Raspberry
Pi with an AI acceleration module). With no attack, the well-trained
object detector can process the benign input (top) and accurately
identify a person walking across the street. However, under attack
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Figure 1: The edge system correctly identifies the person on
the benign input (top) but misdetects given the adversarial
example (bottom), which is visually indistinguishable from
the benign one.
with an adversarial example (bottom), which is visually indistin-
guishable by human perception to the benign input, the same object
detector will be fooled to make erroneous detection.
In this paper, we present three vulnerabilities of DNN object de-
tection systems, by developing threeTargeted adversarialObjectness
Gradient attacks, as a family of TOG attacks on real-time object
detection systems. Although there is a large body of adversarial
attacks to DNN image classifiers [4] in literature, they are mainly
effective in causing DNN classifiers to produce wrong classifica-
tions by using different attack strategies to determine the location
and the amount of per-pixel perturbation to inject to a benign input
image [15]. In contrast, deep object detection networks detect and
segment multiple objects that may be visually overlapping in a
single image or video frame and provide one class label to each of
the detected objects. Thus, an in-depth understanding of various
vulnerabilities of deep object detectors is more complicated than
misclassification attacks in the DNN image classifiers, because the
DNN object detectors have larger and varying attack surfaces, such
as the object existence, object location, and object class label, which
open more opportunities for attacks with various adversarial goals
and sophistications. The TOG attacks are the first targeted adver-
sarial attack method on object detection networks by targeting at
different objectness semantics, such as making objects vanishing,
fabricating more objects, or mislabeling some or all objects. Each
of these attacks injects a human-imperceptible adversarial pertur-
bation to fool a real-time object detector to misbehave in three
different ways, as shown in Figure 2. The object-vanishing attack
in Figure 2(b) causes all objects to vanish from the YOLOv3 [12]
detector. The object-fabrication attack in Figure 2(c) causes the
detector to output many false objects with high confidence. The
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(a) No Attack
(b) Object-vanishing Attack
(c) Object-fabrication Attack
(d) Object-mislabeling Attack (“stop sign” → “umbrella”)
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Figure 2: Illustration of three TOG attacks (2nd-4th rows)
to deep object detection networks. Left: Benign input. Right:
Detection results under the adversarial attacks.
object-mislabeling attack in Figure 2(d) fools the detector to misla-
bel (e.g., the stop sign becomes an umbrella). We further present a
highly efficient universal adversarial perturbation algorithm that
generates a single universal perturbation that can perturb any input
to fool the victim detector effectively. Given the attack is generated
offline, by utilizing adversarial transferability, one can use the TOG
universal perturbation to launch a black-box attack with a very
low (almost zero) online attack cost, which is particularly fatal in
real-time edge applications for object detections.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first present
the TOG attacks in Section 2, then experimental evaluations in
Section 3, followed by concluding remarks in Section 4.
2 TOG ATTACKS
Deep object detection networks, in general, share the same input-
output structure with a similar formulation. They all take the input
image or video frame and produce outputs by using bounding box
techniques to provide object localization for all objects of interest
and by giving the classification for each detected object [8, 10–
13]. The TOG attacks are constructed without restriction to any
particular detection algorithm, as shown in our experimental eval-
uation. To illustrate the details of TOG attacks, we choose to use
YOLOv3 [12] to present our formulation in this section.
Given an input image x , the object detector first detects a large
number of S candidate bounding boxes Bˆ(x) = {oˆ1, oˆ2, . . . , oˆS }
where oˆi = (bˆxi , bˆ
y
i , bˆ
W
i , bˆ
H
i , Cˆi , pˆi ) is a candidate centered at (bˆxi , bˆ
y
i )
having a dimension (bˆWi , bˆHi ) with a probability of Cˆi ∈ [0, 1] hav-
ing an object contained, and aK-class probabilities pˆi = (pˆ1i , pˆ2i , . . . , pˆKi ).
This is done by dividing the input x into mesh grids in different
scales (resolutions) where each grid cell produces multiple candi-
date bounding boxes based on the anchors and is responsible for
locating objects centered at the cell. The final detection results Oˆ(x)
are obtained by applying confidence thresholding to remove can-
didates with low prediction confidence (i.e., max1≤c≤K Cˆi pˆci ) and
non-maximum suppression to exclude those with high overlapping.
An adversarial example x ′ is generated by perturbing a benign
input x sent to the victim detector, aiming to fool the victim to
misdetect randomly (untargeted) or purposefully (targeted). The
generation process of the adversarial example can be formulated as
min | |x ′ − x | |p s .t . Oˆ(x ′) = O∗, Oˆ(x ′) , Oˆ(x), (1)
where p is the distance metric, which can be the L0 norm mea-
suring the percentage of the pixels that are changed, the L2 norm
computing the Euclidean distance, or the L∞ norm denoting the
maximum change to any pixel, andO∗ denotes the target detections
for targeted attacks or any incorrect ones for untargeted attacks.
Figure 3 illustrates the adversarial attacks using TOG. Given an
input source (e.g., an image or video frame), TOG attack module
takes the configuration specified by the adversary to prepare for
the corresponding adversarial perturbation, which will be added to
the input to cause the victim to misdetect. The first three attacks in
TOG: TOG-vanishing, TOG-fabrication, and TOG-mislabeling tailor
an adversarial perturbation for each input, while TOG-universal
uses the same universal perturbation to corrupt any input.
Training a deep neural network often starts with random initial-
ization of model weights, which will be updated slowly by taking
the derivative of the loss function L with respect to the learnable
model weightsW over a mini-batch of input-output pairs {(x˜ ,O)}
with the following equation until convergence:
Wt+1 =Wt − α
∂ E(x˜ ,O)[L(x˜ ;O,Wt )]
∂Wt (2)
where α is the learning rate controlling the step size of the update.
While training deep object detection networks is done by fixing
the input image x˜ and progressively updating the model weights
W towards the goal defined by the loss function, TOG conducts
adversarial attacks by reversing the training process. We fix the
model weights of the victim detector and iteratively update the
input image x towards the goal defined by the type of the attack to
be launched with the following general equation:
x ′t+1 =
∏
x ,ϵ
[
x ′t − αΓ
(
∂L∗(x ′t ;O∗,W)
∂x ′t
)]
(3)
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TOG Attack Module
TOG-vanishing
TOG-fabrication
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Figure 3: An illustration of the adversarial attacks using TOG.
where
∏
x ,ϵ [·] is the projection onto a hypersphere with a radius ϵ
centered at x in Lp norm, Γ is a sign function, and L∗ defines the
loss function to be optimized during the attack.
In deep object detection networks, every ground-truth object in
a training sample x˜ will be assigned to one of the S bounding boxes
according to the center coordinates and the amount of overlapping
with the anchors. Let 1i = 1 if the i-th bounding box is responsible
for an object and 0 otherwise. Then, O = {oi |1i = 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ S}
is a set of ground-truth objects where oi = (bxi ,b
y
i ,b
W
i ,b
H
i ,pi )
with pi = (p1i ,p2i , . . . ,pKi ) and pci = 1 if oi is a class c object.
The optimization objective of the deep object detection network
consists of three parts, each of them corresponds to one of the
three output structures describing a detected object (i.e., existence,
locality, and class label). The objectness score Cˆi ∈ [0, 1] determines
the existence of an object in the candidate bounding box, which
can be learned by minimizing the binary cross-entropy ℓBCE:
Lobj(x˜ ;O,W) =
S∑
i=1
[
1i ℓBCE(1, Cˆi )
]
Lnoobj(x˜ ;O,W) =
S∑
i=1
[
(1 − 1i )ℓBCE(0, Cˆi )
] (4)
The center coordinates (bˆxi , bˆ
y
i ) and dimension (bˆWi , bˆHi ) give the
spatial locality, learned by minimizing the squared error ℓSE:
Lloc(x˜ ;O,W) =
S∑
i=1
1i
[
ℓSE
(
bxi , bˆ
x
i
)
+ ℓSE
(
b
y
i , bˆ
y
i
)
+ℓSE
(√
bWi ,
√
bˆWi
)
+ ℓSE
(√
bHi ,
√
bˆHi
) ] (5)
The last part is the K-class probabilities pˆi = (pˆ1i , pˆ2i , . . . , pˆKi ) that
estimate the class label of the corresponding candidate, optimized
by minimizing the binary cross-entropy:
Lprob(x˜ ;O,W) =
S∑
i=1
1i
∑
c ∈classes
ℓBCE
(
pci , pˆ
c
i
)
(6)
As a result, the deep object detection network can be optimized by
the linear combination of the above loss functions:
L(x˜ ;O,W) =Lobj(x˜ ;O,W) + λnoobjLnoobj(x˜ ;O,W)
+ λlocLloc(x˜ ;O,W) + Lprob(x˜ ;O,W) (7)
where λnoobj and λloc are hyperparameters penalizing incorrect
objectness scores and bounding boxes respectively.
To tailor an adversarial perturbation for each input x to generate
the corresponding adversarial example x ′, TOG is initialized with
the benign example (i.e., x ′0 = x ) and sends the adversarial example
x ′t at the t-th iteration to the victim detector to observe the detection
results Oˆ(x ′t ). If the termination condition defined by the attack
goal is achieved or the maximum number of iterationsT is reached,
x ′t will be returned. Otherwise, it will be perturbed using Equation 3
to become x ′t+1 for the new iteration.
TOG-vanishing. For the TOG object-vanishing attack, we set
the target detection O∗ = ∅ and L∗ = L to cause the victim to
detect no objects on the adversarial example.
TOG-fabrication. For the TOG object-fabrication attack, we
set the target detection O∗ = Oˆ(x) and L∗ = −L to return a large
number of false objects.
TOG-mislabeling. For the TOG object-mislabeling attack, we
set the target detection O∗ to be Oˆ(x) with each object having an
incorrect label and L∗ = L. While any incorrect class label can be
assigned, we adopt a systematic approach to generate targets [15]:
the least-likely (LL) class attack picks the class label with the lowest
probability (i.e., y∗i = argminc pˆ
c
i ), and the most-likely (ML) class
attack finds the class label with the second-highest probability (i.e.,
y∗i = argmaxc,pˆci ,maxu pˆui pˆ
c
i ).
TOG-universal. For the TOG universal attack, the algorithm
will generate a single universal perturbation for making any input
suffer from an object-vanishing attack. Although all three TOG
attacks of generating adversarial perturbation for each input to
fool an object detector are highly effective, they all require iterative
optimization to produce effective perturbations during the online
detection. The TOG universal attack can generate a universal per-
turbation applicable to any input to the detector through iterative
optimization by training. LetD denote the set of N training images,
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Dataset Detector BenignmAP (%)
Adversarial mAP (%)
TOG-vanishing TOG-fabrication TOG-mislabeling (ML) TOG-mislabeling (LL) TOG-universal
VOC
YOLOv3-D 83.43 0.31 1.41 4.58 1.73 14.16
YOLOv3-M 72.51 0.58 3.37 3.75 0.45 20.44
SSD300 78.09 5.58 7.34 2.81 0.78 31.80
SSD512 79.83 9.90 8.34 2.22 0.77 46.17
COCO YOLOv3-D 54.89 0.51 5.89 7.02 0.90 12.73
Table 1: Evaluation of TOG attacks to four victim detectors.
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Figure 4: The average precision of each class in VOC for benign (blue) and adversarial examples generated by TOG attacks.
we want to gradually build the perturbation vector η. At each itera-
tion t , we obtain a training sample x˜ ∈ D and find the additional
perturbation ∆ηt that causes the victim detector to make errors
towards object vanishing attack goal in the current perturbed image
x˜ +ηt . We then add this additional perturbation ∆ηt to the current
universal adversarial perturbation ηt and clip the new perturbation
to ensure the distortion is constrained within [−ϵ, ϵ]. The termina-
tion condition can beκ% of the objects in the training images vanish,
or a maximum number of epochs Q is reached. Upon completing
the attack training, the universal perturbation can be applied to
any given input to the real-time object detector running in an edge
system. It is a black-box attack by adversarial transferability since
it can be employed directly upon receiving a benign input to the
object detector at runtime by only applying the pretrained pertur-
bation. This attack can fool the object detector at an almost zero
online attack time cost.
3 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
Extensive experiments are conducted using two popular benchmark
datasets: PASCAL VOC [2] and MS COCO [6] on four state-of-
the-art object detectors from two popular families of detection
algorithms: “YOLOv3-D" and “YOLOv3-M" are the YOLOv3 [12]
models with a Darknet53 backbone and a MobileNetV1 backbone
respectively. “SSD300" and “SSD512" are the SSD [8] models with an
input resolution of (300×300) and (512×512) respectively. The VOC
2007+2012 dataset has 16, 551 training images and 4, 952 testing
images. The COCO 2014 dataset has 117, 264 training images and
5, 000 testing images.We report the results on the entire test set. The
mean average precision (mAP) of each dataset and victim detector
is presented in the 3rd column of Table 1. All experiments use the
default configurations from each detector without any fine-tuning
of the hyperparameters in each setting. We produce adversarial
perturbations in L∞ norm with a maximum distortion ϵ = 0.031,
a step size α = 0.008, and the number of iterations T = 10. For
universal attacks, 12, 800 images from the training set are extract
to formD with a maximum distortion ϵ = 0.031, a learning rate
α = 0.0001, and the number of training epochs Q = 50. All attacks
were conducted on NVIDIA RTX 2080 SUPER (8 GB) GPU with
Intel i7-9700K (3.60GHz) CPU and 32 GB RAM on Ubuntu 18.04.
3.1 Quantitative Analysis
Table 1 compares the mAP of each dataset and victim detector given
benign examples (the 3rd column) and adversarial examples (the 4th-
8th columns). The four attacks are TOG-vanishing, TOG-fabrication,
TOG-mislabeling with ML and LL targets, and TOG-universal. Com-
pared to the benign mAP, all four attacks drastically reduce the
mAP of the victim detector. For instance, TOG-vanishing attacks
on VOC and COCO break down the detection capability of the
three YOLOv3 detectors: YOLOv3-D (VOC), YOLOv3-M (VOC) and
YOLOv3-D (COCO), by reducing their mAP from 83.43%, 72.51%
and 54.89% to 0.31%, 0.58%, and 0.51% respectively. Also, the TOG-
mislabeling (LL) attacks collapse the mAP of all cases to less than 2%.
Due to the space limit, we only report the comparison of the four vic-
tim detectors with respect to four TOG attacks on the VOC dataset
and the YOLOv3 detector with a Darknet53 backbone (YOLOv3-D)
on the COCO dataset.
It is worth noting that the above adversarial vulnerabilities are
not limited to the detection capability for just a few classes but
equally detrimental to any class supported by the victim detector.
Figure 4 shows the average precision (AP) of all VOC classes on
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Detection Results under four TOG attacks
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Table 2: Qualitative analysis (1st row) and adversarial transferability of TOG attacks (2nd-4th rows).
YOLOv3-M. Compared to the case with no attack (the benign case
with blue curves), all four TOG attacks are shockingly successful
in bringing down the APs of the victim detector, and the TOG-
vanishing, TOG-fabrication, TOG-mislabeling attacks can drasti-
cally reduce the victim detector to very small or close to zero APs.
From the “TOG-universal" column in Table 1 and Figure 4(d), we
make two additional observations. First, both show that our univer-
sal attacks reduce the mAP of all four detectors significantly with
the most noticeable reduction in YOLOv3-D on VOC, with only a
lowmAP of 14.16%, compared with the high mAP of 83.43%with no
attack (benign mAP). Second, it also shows that the TOG-universal
attacks are less effective compared to the other three TOG attacks.
This is because the other three TOG attacks are generated with
per-input optimization, and the TOG-universal attack generates
a single universal perturbation through offline training for each
victim detector, and then it is applied in real-time to any input sent
to the victim detector without per-input fine-tuning optimization.
For example, the TOG-universal for VOC on YOLOv3-M generates
the universal perturbation offline in 8 hours but can be applied as
a black-box attack to the victim detector in only 0.00136 seconds,
compared to 0.37 seconds for TOG-vanishing attack online.
3.2 Qualitative Analysis
Given that all four attacks in TOG significantly reduce mAP, we ded-
icate this subsection to perform qualitative analysis on the intrinsic
behavior of each attack and explain how the detection capability of
a victim detector is stripped off.
The top part of Table 2 shows a test image (left) of a person rid-
ing a bicycle with the detection results made by SSD300 on benign
(the “Benign (No Attack)" column) and adversarial examples gen-
erated by four attacks (from “TOG-vanishing" to “TOG-universal"
columns). Comparing the detection results on the benign example
with the five adversarial counterparts (first row) for SSD300, we
made a number of interesting observations. (1) The adversarial
examples generated by TOG-vanishing and TOG-universal attacks
both successfully remove the victim detector’s capability in de-
tecting objects (i.e., the person and the bicycle cannot be detected
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anymore), even though the TOG-vanishing attack generates its ad-
versarial perturbation tailored for this specific input image, while
TOG-universal uses a pretrained universal perturbation. (2) For the
TOG-fabrication attack, it fools the victim detector to give a large
number of imprecise object detections (bounding boxes), all with
high confidence, successfully tricks the victim detector. From the
information retrieval perspective, our TOG-vanishing and TOG-
universal attacks have a significant impact on the recall of the
victim detector (unable to detect any object). In contrast, the TOG-
fabrication attack fools the victim detector to have a much lower
precision because the detection results contain a larger number of
bounding boxes without objects (“false objects" are everywhere).
(3) The TOG-mislabeling attacks (ML and LL) aim to disguise its
true intent by making the victim detector to detect the same set
of bounding boxes as those on benign examples under no attack
(camouflage) but mislabel some or all detected objects with incor-
rect classes as demonstrated in both the “TOG-mislabeling (ML)"
and the “TOG-mislabeling (LL)" columns in Table 2. For instance,
the person on a bicycle is mislabeled as a dog on a horse with
high confidence under the TOG-mislabeling (ML) attack. For the
TOG-mislabeling (LL) attack, the two objects are both mislabeled
as a bus with at least 95% confidence. Although camouflaged with
bounding boxes, TOG-mislabeling attacks successfully bring down
the precision of the victim detector, because the detected bounding
boxes are associated with wrong labels.
3.3 TOG Attack Transferability
We dedicate this subsection to study the transferability of TOG
attacks by generating adversarial examples on SSD300 and sending
them to the other three detectors: SSD512, YOLOv3-D, and YOLOv3-
M. We study whether the malicious perturbation generated from
the attack to one victim detector can be effectively used as the black-
box attack to fool the others. Table 2 (the 2nd-4th rows) visualizes
the detection results transferring the adversarial examples attacking
SSD300 to the other three victim detectors.
First, with no attack, all three detectors can correctly identify
the person and the bicycle upon receiving the benign input (the 1st
column). Second, the TOG attacks have different degrees of adver-
sarial transferability for different victim detectors under different
attacks. Consider the victim detector SSD512, both TOG-vanishing
and TOG-universal can perfectly transfer the attack to SSD512 with
the same effect (i.e., no object is detected). For TOG-fabrication,
we observe that while the number of false objects is not as much
as in the SSD300 case, a fairly large number of fake objects are
wrongly detected by SSD512. The TOG-mislabeling (LL) attack
is transferred to SSD512 but with the object-fabrication effect in-
stead, while the TOG-mislabeling (ML) attack failed to transfer
for this example. Now consider YOLOv3-D and YOLOv3-M, the
TOG-universal and the TOG-mislabeling (LL) attacks are successful
in transferability for both victim detectors but with different at-
tack effects, such as wrong or additional bounding boxes or wrong
labels. Also, the attacks from SSD300 can successfully transfer to
YOLOv3-M with different attack effects compared to the attack
results in SSD300. However, only the universal attack from SSD300
succeeds in transferring, but the other three TOG attacks failed to
transfer to YOLOv3-D for this example. Note that with adversarial
(a) A screenshot of the robust ob-
ject detection system.
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Computing Device
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running ensemble detections.
Figure 5: Robust real-time object detection using Intel NCS2.
transferability, the attacks are black-box, generated, and launched
without any prior knowledge of the three victim detectors.
4 CONCLUSION
We have presented TOG, a family of targeted adversarial objectness
gradient attacks on deep object detection networks executing in
edge systems. TOG attacks enable adversaries to generate human-
imperceptible perturbations, either by employing adversarial per-
turbation optimized for each input or by offline training a universal
perturbation that is effective on any inputs to the victim detector.
We also studied the adversarial transferability from one victim de-
tector to others through black-box attacks. Through experiments
on two benchmark datasets and four popular deep object detectors,
we show the serious adversarial vulnerabilities of the representative
deep object detection networks when deploying in edge systems.
From our experiences and experimental study on different vic-
tim detectors and on the adversarial transferability, we observe the
divergence of attack effects on different detectors. In general, an ad-
versarial example attacking a victim model may not have the same
adverse effect when used as a black-box attack based on its transfer-
ability. This is because the weak spot of attack transferability may
vary from one detector to another trained by using a diverse DNN
structure or diverse DNN algorithms as identified in [1, 7]. Our
ongoing work is to develop diversity-enhanced ensemble object
detection systems that promote strong robustness guarantees for
defensibility and resilience against TOG attacks. Our preliminary
robustness study with Intel Neural Compute Stick 2 (NCS2) as the
AI acceleration module on edge systems shows some encouraging
results. Figure 5 shows a robust object detection edge system devel-
oped at DiSL, Georgia Institute of Technology, which offers real-
time performance in an edge system using an ensemble of multiple
object detectors. The alpha release of the open-source software pack-
age is accessible on GitHub at https://github.com/git-disl/DLEdge.
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